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INTRODUCTION
This essay discusses the implications of some important
work in experimental philosophy to criminal law and tort law.
In a series of extremely interesting and challenging studies,
Joshua Knobe and others have demonstrated that we are more
likely to attribute intent to those whose actions lead to bad
results than to those whose actions lead to good results. In one
version, a middle-management executive boasts that his new
process will not only make money for the company, but also
help the environment. His boss approves the new venture, but
makes it clear that he doesn't care about helping the
environment, he's doing it for the money. Sure enough, the new
process does help the environment. Yet we do not give the boss
credit for intentionally having made the environment cleaner.
In contrast, when the mid-level manager laments that the new
process will make money at the expense of damaging the
environment, we attribute to the boss who approved the new
venture an intent to have harmed the environment.' This
asymmetry is potentially important. It suggests that we are
somehow designed to lash out at wrongdoers, making us all
t Don Forchelli Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and
Director, Center for the Study of Law, Language and Cognition, Brooklyn Law School.
Thanks to Joshua Knobe for discussion of many of these issues, to Steven Dean, Ted
Janger, Adam Kolber, Rebecca Kysar, Bertram Malle, Brett McDonnell, Tony Sebok,
Chris Serkin, Aaron Twerski, and Dan Simon for helpful suggestions, and to the
University of Minnesota School of Law and the University of Southern California
Gould School of Law, where I presented earlier versions of this work. Thanks also to
Steven Bentsianov for his most valuable research.I dedicate this essay to the career of my friend and colleague, Roger Shuy,
Professor Emeritus, Georgetown University, who is a pioneer in the study of language
and law, and whose life represents a commitment to sheer decency, the value discussed
in this essay.
I See Joshua Knobe, Intentional Actions and Side-Effects in Ordinary
Language, 63 ANALYSIS 190 (2003).
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moral actors. If the asymmetry is the result of our attributing
blame too easily, then it suggests that prosecutors and
plaintiffs' lawyers might have it easier than the definitions of
crimes and torts would suggest. It has received so much
attention that it has been given a name: "The Knobe [Elffect."'
In this essay, I suggest an explanation for the
asymmetry by looking more closely at the language of intent
and causation. Intent is built into our speech without our
having to point it out. We mention intent in everyday
communication only when a person's state of mind deviates
sufficiently from baseline expectations. If you tell someone you
went out for dinner last night, you do not need to tell them that
you did it on purpose. By looking at the circumstances in which
we do make mention of intent in ordinary speech, we can begin
to draw inferences about what our baseline expectations are. I
argue here that the Knobe Effect results from the fact that our
baseline is that people will act within social norms to
accomplish socially-useful goals. This means, somewhat
ironically, that our bias toward blame results from our
tendency to expect the good. To the extent that social norms
track moral judgment, the asymmetry between blame and
praise suggests that moral judgment affects cognitive judgment
as Knobe claims.
As for causation, I agree with Knobe that moral
considerations pervade our judgments. But they do so, as Mark
Alicke' and others4 have argued, when there are competing
causal stories consistent with the facts, and we need to choose
among them. Moral judgment influences our choice among
possible, legitimate causal accounts, but it is not sufficient to
create a causal account from one that would not otherwise be
available.
In an earlier essay, I argued that blaming arises
naturally because its primitives-the recognition of a bad
outcome, causation, and attribution of state of mind-are such
basic cognitive functions that moral attribution is cognitively
' See generally Adam Feltz, The Knobe Effect: A Brief Overview, 28 J. MIND
& BEHAV. 265 (2008) for a discussion of some of the literature citing this asymmetry.
3 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 368 (1992) [hereinafter Alicke, Culpable Causation]. For Alicke's reaction to
Knobe's work, see Mark D. Alicke, Blaming Badly, J. COGNITION & CULTURE
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 2-4, available at httpJ/www.unc.edu/-knobe/Alicke.pdf)
[hereinafter Alicke, Blaming Badly].
4 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of
Self Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (2008).
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inexpensive. Knobe pointed out in response that my theory had
no way of accounting for the kind of asymmetry between blame
and praise illustrated by his corporate executives.6 That is, if
blaming is readily available cognitively because it is triggered
whenever a person with a bad state of mind causes a bad
outcome, and judgments about causation, valence, and state of
mind are made routinely for other reasons in any event, then
praising should be just as easy since it is triggered by exactly
the same considerations, the only difference being the valence
of the outcome. Knobe was correct.7 This essay offers an
explanation for the asymmetry and explores some legal
ramifications.
Should the law care about whether we blame more
easily than we give credit and the reasons for any such
asymmetry? Whether or not it should care, it does care. For the
most part, the legal system is structured around baseline
expectations of appropriate conduct consistent with social
norms, with civil or criminal sanctions following from failure to
meet these norms. The system expects people to behave
properly, and it reacts negatively when they do not. There is
far less reward for good conduct than there is punishment for
bad. Furthermore, the legal system puts a great deal of weight
on causation and intent in areas such as criminal law and
torts. To the extent that our judgments of causation and intent
are at odds with the moral intuitions of the citizenry, the law
stands to lose some of its moral force.
The first part of this essay consists of my effort to
explain the Knobe Effect. The second touches on ways in which
the asymmetry it describes is relevant to our understanding of
how the law is structured. In particular, it is no accident that
legal systems are generally organized around a set of high
expectations for conduct and sanctions for falling below those
standards, and not as an incentive system in which the
expectations are low, and rewards are given for rising above
them. While economists regard these approaches as equivalent,
they are not the same from a psychological perspective.
Further, the negative branch of the Knobe Effect-that we
' Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
6 Joshua Knobe, Cognitive Processes Shaped by the Impulse to Blame, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 929, 930 (2006).
7 Lawrence M. Solan, Where Does Blaming Come From?, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
939, 939 (2006).
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construe unwanted side-effects as intentionally caused when
we knew they would occur-plays an important role in tort law.
In fact, Section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
specifically calls for known negative side effects of an
intentional act to be treated themselves as intentional acts.'
However, the boundaries of this doctrine are currently a matter
of dispute. Experimental work by Knobe and others
demonstrates that at least some version of this principle is
consistent with everyday moral intuitions. However, the
Restatement distinguishes more than Knobe does between
moral judgment on the one hand, and the attribution of actual
intent on the other. Based on empirical findings by Bertram
Malle and others, I suggest that the Restatement's position is
probably the better one. The third part of the essay is a brief
conclusion.
I. INTENT, PRAISE, AND BLAME
A. Intent in Ordinary Speech
What does it mean to do something intentionally?
Psychologist Bertram Malle and Joshua Knobe conducted
numerous experiments on the folk psychology of intention.'
Basically, prototypical intent involves an individual with the
skill to carry out a task performing that task because he
intends to do it, knowing that he is engaging in that task, and
wanting to achieve the predictable result of the action. Thus,
intent is most often acknowledged when an individual intends
not only his actions, but also intends the foreseeable
consequences of his actions. In other words, the folk psychology
of intent includes both general intent and specific intent, to use
the legal terminology.1" This explains why law students find it
strange when a tort or crime requires only general intent. They
are not used to disaggregating their ordinary sense of what it
means to intend an action.
s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
See Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, The Folk Concept of Intentionality,
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1997); see also Alfred R. Mele & Paul K
Moser, Intentional Action, 28 NoOs 39 (1994).
10 The distinction is commonplace in legal analysis. For one recent statement,
see People v. Chance, 189 P.3d 971, 981 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("A
specific intent crime is an offense that requires the defendant to not only intend to do
an act but to also intend to achieve a consequence, such as (in the case of assault) the
intent 'to commit a violent injury on the person of another' whereas a general intent
crime requires only that the defendant intend to do the act." (citations omitted)).
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This is not to say that all five elements must always be
present for us to attribute intent. Subsequent experimentation
suggests that some conditions are necessary, others
prototypical." For example, someone who plans to do a bad
thing for a bad purpose and then finds himself having done this
bad thing without being aware that he did it will be judged to
have at least some intent. Nonetheless, when all of these
elements are present, people are most likely to agree that an
actor has acted intentionally.
One way of learning about how we understand intent is
to examine how we talk about it. Let us look more closely at
how we speak of intent in ordinary language. Consider an
individual, Mario, who has a ticket for an early morning flight,
say, 6:30 a.m. He wants to get to the airport an hour early, and
knows from experience that it takes about fifteen minutes to
get there by car. The day before, he calls a taxi service and asks
for a cab to pick him up at his home at 5:15 a.m. and drive him
to the airport. And that is just what happens. Upon arriving at
the terminal, he pays the driver, including a tip, enters the
airport, checks in at the counter, passes through security, buys
a newspaper to read on the flight, has time for a quick cup of
coffee at the airport's Starbucks, of which he takes advantage,
and then boards the plane.
Every one of these events is intentional. But it would
sound very strange-indeed, almost demented-to point that
out. Thus, we do not say:
(1) Mario intentionally called a taxi service and purposely asked for
a cab to pick him up at his home at 5:15 a.m.
(2) Mario paid the driver on purpose and intentionally gave him a
tip.
(3) Mario got out of the car with intent and then intentionally
entered the airport.
And so on.
We do not say these things, because we assume that he
did them on purpose without ever mentioning his state of mind.
Linguistic pragmatics tells us what is so strange about (1)-(3).
In everyday interaction, we assume that the speaker intends to
advance the conversation in a cooperative way, and we draw
" See Bertram F. Malle, Intentionality, Morality, and Their Relationship in
Human Judgment, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 87 (2006).
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inferences about the speaker's intent by evaluating what is
said against this underlying assumption. That is why if Mario
tells his wife Adela, "I have a meeting at 5:30" in response to
her earlier remark, "I think we need milk," Mario will have
understood Adela to have asked him to buy milk, and Adela
will have understood Mario to have said that he will not be able
to do so. This is true even though Adela never asks Mario to
buy milk, and Mario never says that he cannot buy milk. It
appears from this snippet that the store at which he would
have bought the milk will close before he has a chance to get
there and they both know that fact, even though neither of
them has said anything about it. Grice's Cooperative Principle
("[miake your contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged")," and more specifically,
his maxim of relation ("[b]e relevant"), capture this process.'3
Mario assumes that Adela mentioned the milk for a reason,
and Adela assumes that Mario intended a relevant contribution
to the conversation when he mentions the time of his meeting,
and draws appropriate inferences about the milk.
The Cooperative Principle also explains what is wrong
with saying that Mario intentionally did all the things he did to
get to the airport. Intent is built into our models of these
events, including both intent to perform the actions and intent
to achieve the foreseeable results of those actions. Grice's
maxim of quantity ("[d]o not make your contribution more
informative than is required")4 operates to inhibit us from
expressing a state of mind that we already infer from the
language and context. For this reason, any mention of Mario's
intentional state of mind implies that he is acting with a level
of intent in addition to the intent that we would ordinarily
understand without further mention of his state of mind.
Otherwise, there would be no reason to mention it at all.
This does not mean that intent must be part of the
semantics of the verbs in these sentences, which include call,
ask, pay, give, get out of, and enter. For example, I can
unintentionally call a taxi by pushing the wrong speed-dial
button on my telephone. Perhaps I thought I was calling a
12 H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 3: SPEECH
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friend to take me to the airport, but I inadvertently called the
taxi service. In that case, I can say,
(4) I inadvertently called a taxi service to take me to the airport.
a. Thank goodness that mistake didn't cause any trouble.
b. It cost me a fortune.
In (4a) the error has led to a good outcome, in (4b) a bad one. In
both versions, however, I have overridden the default
assumption that I called the taxi service on purpose. Because I
can express my non-prototypical intent by adding an adverb
("inadvertently" in this instance) without creating a
contradictory statement, it appears that it is not the verbal
semantics that is the source of the default assumption. Rather,
the assumption comes from an internalized social psychology
that tells us that people do things for a reason and intend the
foreseeable consequences of what they do,"5 which is consistent
with Malle and Knobe's folk psychology of intent that includes
both general and specific intent. This clearly holds for our
hypothetical cab ride to the airport, where every mention of
intent seems strangely redundant.
By the same token, we can highlight our intent when we
speak of everyday events by stating it explicitly. But we do so
principally when we mean something other than the ordinary
baseline intent of accomplishing the intended goal, such as
getting to the airport. For example, I may say (1) (repeated as
(5)), but only under some specific and unusual circumstances:
(5) Mario intentionally called a taxi service and purposely asked for
a cab to pick him up at his home a 5:15 a.m.
Say that out of loyalty and friendship, you offer to take Mario
to the airport in your car at some ungodly hour. You tell me
that fact, and I utter (5) in response. By intentionally, I would
not mean the opposite of accidentally. Rather, I would mean
that Mario has acted with more than the ordinary intent that
goes into calling a cab, referring to his added goal of saving you
the inconvenience of driving him to the airport. I could finish
the sentence by adding, "precisely so that you would not even
think of going so far out of your way." In such cases, the very
15 For a discussion of intent being built in to our internalized social
psychology, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 17 (1987) and RAY
JACKENDOFF, LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE 262-65 (2007).
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expression of intent indicates that I am expressing volition
beyond the normal intent of accomplishing the expressed goal.
B. Praise, Blame, and Baselines of Intent
Now let us return to our corporate executive who has
approved a new project that will help the environment, but
doesn't care that it will help the environment. The puzzle with
which we began was to find an explanation for the fact that we
do not give him credit for his assistance. At this point, we can
see why it is that we do not give him credit for intentionally
helping the environment. If we said nothing about his state of
mind, we would assume that he intended the benevolent
consequences of his action: He approved a profitable venture
that will help improve the environment. When we utter (6)
under ordinary circumstances,
(6) The CEO approved a process that is expected to be both profitable
and environmentally friendly.
the baseline assumption is that there is an intention not only to
approve the process but also to achieve the foreseeable results
of approving the process.
Contrast this situation-the normal one-with Knobe's
story of the corporate executive who goes out of his way to say
that he doesn't care about helping the environment in deciding
to go ahead with the new venture. That person has announced
that his level of intent is less than the baseline, since he does
not intend to achieve the positive foreseeable consequences of
his action, and in fact, is callously indifferent to the good he is
doing the world. It should not be the least bit surprising that
people do not accept the statement that he intentionally helped
the environment. When a person acts with more intent than
the baseline, we make mention of it as relevant new
information; when a person acts more or less at the baseline of
intent, we acknowledge the intent if asked about it, although
mentioning it overtly sounds redundant as described in the
previous section; and when a person acts with less intent than
the baseline, attributing intent to that individual is taken as a
false statement.
We can similarly explain our reaction to the version in
which the executive was callously indifferent toward hurting
the environment. People hearing that version tend to attribute
intent notwithstanding that the executive does not have
hurting the environment as an affirmative goal. This again is a
[Vol. 75:2
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function of deviation from baseline expectations. We assume
that people act within social norms to achieve socially accepted
goals. In most academic environments, the moderator of a
presentation need not utter (7) to the audience when the
speaker takes the floor:
(7) I'm sure you will behave yourselves during the presentation and
not make noises during the talk.
We have no reason to believe that the members of the audience
would do such a thing, although such a statement might be
appropriate enough in a gathering, say, of teenagers with
emotional problems where the defaults are different, or at
certain political events. In those situations, it might even be
appropriate to mention that a listener accidentally disrupted a
talk by, say, knocking over his chair, if the baseline assumption
is that disruptions will occur with intent.
The executive who does not care about hurting the
environment has acted with more intent than the default level
for a person causing harm, which is to do so inadvertently. Let
us turn to examples of causation to see how the baselines for
causing good and causing harm vary. Compare the following
two sentences:
(8) a. Mario fixed the printer.
b. Mario broke the printer.
Both fix and break are causative verbs: causation is built into
their meanings. Only if Mario actually caused the printer to be
fixed/broken would it be appropriate to utter the sentences in
(8). Crucially, we assume that Mario acted intentionally in (8a),
but not in (8b). In (8b), our baseline assumption is that the
breakage was an accident. Our default is that we break things
by accident and fix them on purpose. These assumptions may
be overridden by circumstances. If Mario was in the middle of a
violent tantrum, his breaking the printer may have been one of
many intentional acts leading to a bad outcome. But we do not
assume that he intentionally violated social norms without our
providing some information that will override the default
assumption. With bad outcomes, it is not redundant to speak of
intent specifically. Thus, there is nothing strange about (9):
(9) Mario intentionally broke the printer.
Since our baseline for bad outcomes is a state of mind less
culpable than intent, attributing intent to Mario adds new
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information, and thus does not violate the maxim of quantity
by adding information that we already know. Similarly, some
verbs are more loaded with intent than is break. If, for
example, we were to substitute smash for break in (8b), we
would be more inclined to believe that he did it on purpose in
the first place. Expressing intent overtly when the verb is
smash seems redundant, but not as redundant as when the
outcomes are positive. Thus, it is easy to attribute intent to the
executive who does not care about the harm he causes, and
most people do just that.
Note that intent might not be the best characterization
of the executive's actual state of mind. Were the choices
expanded to those in (10), the results might have been
different:
(10) a. The executive intentionally caused harm to the environment.
b. While the executive did not intentionally cause harm to the
environment, he is nonetheless blameworthy because he
acted with an unacceptably callous attitude toward the
foreseeable consequences of his decision.
c. The executive did not intentionally cause harm to the
environment.
My sense of the story is most consistent with (10b). But if I had
only options (a) and (c) to choose from, I might opt for (a) on the
theory that it at least recognizes that the executive has acted
with a state of mind that is blameworthy. In contrast, (c) might
be consistent with my not assigning blame, which would fall
beneath my moral standards."6
Recent studies by Guglielmo and Malle'7 report results
consistent with this intuition. They presented subjects with
Knobe's corporate executive story and gave them a choice of
five characterizations of the CEO's state of mind. Only 10%
chose "the CEO intentionally harmed the environment,"
whereas 70% chose "the CEO intentionally adopted a profit-
raising program that he knew would harm the environment."8
1" Adams and Steadman make a similar point in their pragmatic explanation
of the Knobe Effect. See Fred Adams & Annie Steadman, Intentional Action in
Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding, 64 ANALYSIS 173
(2004); see also Alicke, Blaming Badly, supra note 3, manuscript at 9.
17 Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle, Can Unintended Side Effects be
Intentional?: Solving a Puzzle in People's Judgments of Intentionality and Morality
(July 2009) (unpublished manuscript, httpJ/www.uoregon.edu/-sgugliellpubs/
Guglielmo&Malle side_effects.pdf).
18 Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Because there were five choices, chance performance was 20%,
which means that subjects affirmatively rejected the
description that the CEO harmed the environment
intentionally.19 Notably, notwithstanding that the subjects
distinguished between intentional and knowing acts, they
assigned very high levels of blame, suggesting that
intentionally causing a negative side effect is tantamount to
intent with respect to moral culpability, even if the two are
analytically distinct states of mind.0
The philosopher Thomas Nadelhoffer conducted an
experiment that provides some support for the baseline
explanation.2 ' After discussing Knobe's results, he presented
forty college students with the following vignette:
Imagine that Steve and Jason are two friends who are competing
against one another in an essay competition. Jason decides to help
Steve edit his essay. Ellen, a mutual friend, says, "Don't you realize
that if you help Steve, you will decrease your own chances of winning
the competition?" Jason responds, "I know that helping Steve
decreases my chances of winning, but I don't care at all about that. I
just want to help my friend!" Sure enough, Steve wins the
competition because of Jason's help.22
When asked, 55% of the students said that Jason had
intentionally decreased his own chances of winning, a
percentage far larger than those who received the positive
version in Knobe's study, but far smaller than those who
received Knobe's negative version.' These mixed results should
not be surprising. I personally vacillate between understanding
the story as one about the infliction of self-harm beyond the
baseline (accidental, as in getting a paper cut), and as one
about Jason's taking a risk that he knew might mature into
harm, but hoped that it would not. In both understandings, the
question is how Jason's decision matches up to what we would
consider ordinary judgment. Hence the absence of consensus.
If I am right about what I have said thus far, praise and
blame operate symmetrically after all. Only when we deviate
from the baseline do we notice intent in either direction. What
creates the asymmetry is not that we think differently about
1" See id. at 14-15.
20 See id. at 26.
21 Thomas Nadelhoffer, On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of
Intentionality, 24 J. OF THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 196 (2004).
2 Id. at 209.
22 Id.
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praise and blame, but that the baseline of intent is not halfway
between them. Knobe is thus correct in his claim that
judgments of state of mind are colored by judgments of whether
the individual is acting within acceptable norms. In turn, the
social norms that best trigger the asymmetry may well be ones
that contain moral content. Doris, Knobe, and Woolfolk adopt a
similar perspective, accurately stating that "responsibility
attribution is from the outset deeply infused with normative
considerations."24
Significantly, while the Knobe Effect results from the
application of pragmatics to the baseline intent, it cannot be
explained by pragmatics alone.25 The key to triggering the effect
is the baseline. What pragmatic implicature provides is
evidence of the effect's application in everyday discourse.
Where we locate the baseline is not a matter of pragmatics-it
is a matter of social norms. Once we identify the baseline,
however, then the rest of the facts fall out from ordinary
pragmatic implicature. We do not specify the state of mind that
would be assumed in ordinary experience because that would
be redundant, and thus a violation of Grice's maxim of
quantity. When state of mind is mentioned, it is because the
state of mind is other than that which would be expected, and
is thus providing new information. Our corporate executive
who approved the environmentally-friendly process acted with
less than the ordinary amount of intent, so it would be
especially infelicitous for us to credit him by using language
that assumes that he acted with at least the ordinary amount
of intent.
This analysis differs from other efforts to offer
pragmatic explanations for the asymmetry between blame and
praise. In particular, Adams and Steadman argue that the
attribution of intent in the story with a negative outcome
results from people's disapproval of the conduct and expressing
that disapproval through intent as a pragmatic matter.26 They
argue:
We suspect that what is going on in the minds of the folk is that they
disapprove of the chairman's indifference to the harm of the
24 John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk, Variantism About
Responsibility, 21 PHIL. PERSP. 183, 197 (2007).
21 See Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser, Moral Judgment and Causal Judgment:
Two Experiments, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed.)
(forthcoming).
26 See Adams & Steadman, supra note 16, at 178.
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environment. They want to blame that indifference and they know
that their blame is stronger and more effective at discouraging such
acts, if the chairman is said to have done the action intentionally. 2
While there may be some bootstrapping of this sort, this
explanation does not appear to be adequate to explain the
range of data. For example, Steven Sverdlik has found that
when given the opportunity, people are perfectly willing to find
conduct both blameworthy and unintentional at the same
time. 8 In Sverdlik's studies, this happens when someone knows
that he will cause discomfort, would rather not cause that
discomfort, but does it anyway, accepting the side effect of his
actions.' A person is considered blameworthy for mowing his
lawn early in the morning knowing that it will wake the
neighbors, recognizing that he did this without specific intent."
For that matter, we find the consequences of negligent action to
be blameworthy, without ascribing any intent at all.
C. Causation and Outcome
Help and harm are causative verbs. Causation is
embedded in their meaning. You cannot harm someone without
causing that person to be worse off, and you cannot help a
person without causing that person to be better off. As John
Darley and I point out in an earlier article, people do not
always agree upon whether a person caused an outcome or
whether that person did not cause the outcome, but set the
conditions that enabled the outcome to happen." In an
experimental study, we found that the more culpable an
individual, the more people tended to consider that person the
cause of a bad outcome. For example, when an individual left
his keys in the ignition of a car, and the car was stolen by a
teenager who in turn injured a pedestrian, people were more
likely to call the key-leaver a cause of the accident when he
intentionally left his keys in the car than when he did so
innocently.
27 Id. at 178.
2 Steven Sverdlik, Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense
Thought About Action, 24 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. PSYCHOL. 224, 234 (2004).
29Id.
' Id. at 226-30.
" Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution and Legal
Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001).
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Mark Alicke reached similar conclusions.32 He presented
people with a story about an accident which may or may not
have been the fault of the protagonist.33 In one version, the
protagonist was on his way home to give a gift to his parents,
in another, to involve himself with drugs.' People were far
more likely to blame him for causing the accident when he was
up to no good, even though the description of the accident
remained constant.35
Knobe and Fraser have conducted studies with similar
results.' Two people with equal opportunity to service an office
machine fail to do so: one is responsible for maintaining the
machine, the other is not. We say that the failure of the
responsible person caused the machine to break when it does so
because it has not been properly maintained.
What the studies have in common is that they begin
with stories in which causation is equivocal. In ours, it is
equivocal because we can conceptualize the situation as being
either causation or enablement. In Alicke's, causation is
equivocal because subjects were confronted with a set of facts
susceptible to different causal explanations. And in Knobe and
Fraser's it is equivocal because the cause, if there was one, was
the failure to interrupt a process that was otherwise occurring.
In all three cases, subjects' moral judgment contributed to
whether they believed that the protagonist had caused harm.
Thus, while people appear able to judge intent and blame
independently,37 an actor's state of mind does influence
judgments about causation when causation is equivocal, and
judgments of causation influence the extent to which that
person is held responsible.
Returning to Knobe's story of the corporate executives,
just as people construe intent asymmetrically, they may
construe causation asymmetrically as well. That is, if subjects
had been asked whether the boss hurt or helped the
environment without any mention of his state of mind, we
might expect to see the same effect, although perhaps
somewhat weaker. That is because, just as the Knobe Effect
requires that there be some range of possible states of mind for




See Knobe & Fraser, supra note 25.
37 See Sverdlik, supra note 28, at 234.
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the actor, the examples used to illustrate the phenomena also
contain some uncertainty about causation. Moral judgment, it
thus seems, contributes to attributions of both state of mind
and causation when language and circumstance leave open
more than one possibility.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Laws as High Expectation Signals
There is no doubt that the psychology behind our
attributions of intent, causation, and moral responsibility is of
legal relevance. As Robinson and Darley have noted, the legal
system becomes suspect in the eyes of citizens when it uses
definitions that are at odds with their everyday moral
judgments.38 I will not pursue this issue in detail here, but it is
worth noting that the law's distinction between general and
specific intent is quite unnatural, and might be the subject of
interesting experimental research.
The asymmetry between the assignment of intent in
good and bad outcomes may help to explain significant aspects
of the legal system's structure. In the eighteenth century,
Blackstone noticed in his introduction to the Commentaries on
the Laws of England that legal systems tend to organize
themselves around expecting people to behave within the legal
rules, and punish them for failing to do so:
[W]e find that those civil laws, which enforce and enjoin our duty, do
seldom, if ever, propose any privilege or gift to such as obey that law;
but do constantly come armed with a penalty denounced against
transgressors, either expressly defining the nature and quantity of
the punishment, or else leaving it to the discretion of the judges, and
those who are entrusted with the care of putting the laws in
execution.3 9
The account of praising and blaming discussed in this
essay predicts that this should be so. Our baseline expectation
in everyday life is compliance with social norms, with the
attribution of blame for those who fail to do so. It should not be
at all surprising that we organize our legal system around the
way we think about praise and blame in ordinary life as
reflected both in language use and in judgment about moral
38 PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME:
COMMINITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
39 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *56.
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attribution, as the work of Knobe and others illustrates. In fact,
that legal systems are structured around defining illegal
conduct, tempered by excuses and justifications, may well be
universal.
John Mikhail's contribution to this Symposium suggests
that this approach is on the right track. Mikhail (with the help
of research assistants), has examined homicide statutes in 163
jurisdictions from around the world." All 163 jurisdictions have
homicide statutes, and all 163 statutes have a mental state
element. In addition, some justifications, such as self-defense,
and some excuses, such as diminished mental capacity, appear
universal, although others, including duress, necessity, and
provocation, are not. Nonetheless, the structure of the law-a
basic prohibition, tempered by excuses and justifications-does
seem to be characteristic of every legal system studied.'
This is by no means the only way for a legal system to
organize itself. Economists point out that the withholding of a
benefit for those who fail to engage in desired conduct has the
same economic effect as giving the benefit generally, and
imposing a sanction on those who do not engage in the
conduct.4 The tax system is replete with "tax expenditures"
that have this structure. The most notable in today's news is
the mortgage interest deduction, which encourages people to
incur debt to become homeowners. Various kinds of energy tax
credits also create incentives for people to engage in desirable
behavior. As Professor Wolfman noted more than twenty years
ago, illustrating his point with an example that is still current
today,
If a special exclusion from an oil company's income were recognized
as the equivalent of a subsidy (because taxpayers in other businesses
are denied a similar exclusion), the congressional debate might focus
more sharply on just who benefits, on whether the subsidy is wise
40 John Mikhail, Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal?: Evidence from
Comparative Criminal Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 497 (2009).
41 id.
42 The point has also become part of the legal discourse. See, e.g., Christopher
Serkin, Existing Uses and The Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) ("Of course, as many have observed, it is hard to find a limiting
principle that distinguishes between a regulation preventing a harm and a regulation
conferring a benefit, but that such a line even needs to be drawn demonstrates that
existing uses are normally protected.").
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policy and, if so, on whether Congress can better achieve its objective
through direct expenditure or through the tax system.'
Yet people do not experience the imposition of a tax the
same as the withholding of a benefit. In a series of very
interesting studies, Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron
have explored some of these reactions by asking people to react
to various scenarios relating to taxation and its economic
equivalents." As these authors point out, a tax bonus for those
who have children is financially equivalent to a tax penalty for
those who do not have children."5 In both cases, people with
children will pay less than people without children. What
changes are the defaults. In one instance, a society says that
we assume that you do not have children, but if you do, then
you can pay less tax than the default. In the other, a society
says that we assume that you do have children, but if you don't,
you will have to pay a surcharge above the normal tax amount.
Not surprisingly, McCaffery and Baron found that people
strongly prefer bonuses to surcharges. They are willing to
accept a bonus for marriage or for children, but not a surcharge
for being single or childless, even though they come to exactly
the same amount in terms of dollars taxed. 4' The literature on
behavioral law and economics discusses other ways in which
people react asymmetrically to situations that are financially
equivalent as the result of framing effects. 7
These results are consistent with the explanation of the
Knobe Effect presented in this essay. People are quick to blame
individuals for conduct falling beneath the baseline of
acceptable behavior. They are indeed willing to reward when
conduct rises above the baseline, but the baseline is relatively
high, making blame scenarios more prevalent. Not having
children does not fall below any standard of acceptable social
43 Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 491, 493 (1985) (reviewing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985)).
See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 106 (2006).
41 Id. at 114-15.
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 147, 150-53
(Terry Connolly, Hal R. Arkes, & Kenneth R. Hammond, eds., 2d ed. 2000). For
discussion in legal contexts, see Russell B. Korobkin & Russell Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1108 (2000) and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Loses, and the
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996).
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conduct in our society, however. Thus, people are reluctant to
penalize others for not having children, although they are
willing to reward those who do on the theory that raising
children produces some social good beyond that which is
required of all citizens.
We do not, however, generally structure our laws as
incentives to avoid fines and prison sentences for obeying the
law, even if they can be accurately characterized that way.
Staying with the tax code, criminal laws do not say, "Whoever
pays his taxes shall not be fined," nor do we give a bonus to
people who pay their taxes, perhaps in the form of a periodic
tax amnesty. Rather, we enact laws that punish people who
break the law.
We could do otherwise, and do otherwise in other
institutional settings. Staying close to home, many law schools
have summer research stipend programs to encourage faculty
to write productively. A law school that pays faculty members
ten percent of their salary in exchange for writing an article
during the summer months could, consistent with the
framework of legal systems that I have described, raise the
salaries of all faculty members, and then withhold 9.1% of the
salaries of those faculty members who do not write during the
summer. Although economically equivalent, the punitive
system would be experienced as just that: a punitive system,
and would be demoralizing. Thus, in some kinds of settings, we
prefer incentives for good conduct to punishment for bad
conduct.
Nonetheless, the principal generalization holds: legal
systems are chiefly structured around punishment for the
violation of legal rules. The fact that they could equivalently be
stated in terms of incentives is irrelevant. This is a significant
by-product of the Knobe Effect, which in turn, is a by-product of
our setting baseline conduct on the side of high expectations of
good conduct for good reason. Recognizing the source of this
orientation might give policy makers more flexibility in
deciding when to override it. The most natural way to think
may not be the most productive way to think when it comes to
such matters as the creation of an efficient and productive
economic system.
B. Knowledge of Side Effects as Intent in Tort Law
The fact that we have a high baseline expectation
explains in part why we prefer punishment for bad conduct to
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reward for good conduct in our legal systems, but it says
nothing about whether a legal system will reflect Knobe's
finding with respect to those whose acts lead to bad side effects:
that the legal system will attribute intent. It is entirely
possible to structure a legal system around punishment, but
not hold those who knowingly cause negative side effects
responsible for having done so intentionally.
Significantly, the law generally acts in conformity with
this aspect of Knobe's work as well. The law does not apply
evenly, but in broad strokes it reflects the moral intuitions of
Knobe's experimental subjects. This is an important point,
because, as Robinson and Darley argue forcefully, respect for
the criminal law is in large part contingent upon its reflecting
the everyday intuitions of the citizens to whom it applies. 8 To
the extent that the law treats lightly those who act
intentionally, knowing-but not intending-the bad side effects
of their acts, the law will be seen as encouraging immoral
behavior. Consider Section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this
Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his
act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it.4
Comment b then explains:
All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are
intended, as the word is used in this Restatement. Intent is not,
however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to
result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if
he had in fact desired to produce the result.'
The Restatement provides the following illustration:
1. A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A
knows that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to
injure C, but knows that his act is substantially certain to do so. C is
injured by the explosion. A is subject to liability to C for an
intentional tort."'
48 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 38, at 201-02.
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (emphasis added).
Id. cmt. b.
51 Id. illus. 1.
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Significantly, the Restatement does not say that knowledge and
intent are indistinguishable. Rather, it says that those who act
with knowledge that their act will cause harm are held to the
same level of responsibility as those who do act with intent.
Thus, the Restatement's position is consistent with the results
of Guglielmo and Malle reported above," and with my own
analysis, which suggests that subjects recognize the difference
between knowledge and intent, but judge acts with known
negative side effects harshly because the conduct falls so far
below the baseline of societal expectations.'
To see the application of this principle in more detail,"
consider Vision Air Flight Service v. M/V National Pride," a
case decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1998. The plaintiff had
sold two airplane refueling trucks to a buyer for use in an
airport in the Philippines. The defendant company was
responsible for shipping the trucks. When it removed the first
of the two trucks from the ship using a crane, it damaged the
truck severely. The cable harness that was put around the
refueling truck tightened up around the vehicle and literally
crushed it. That was a negligent act, and under the terms of
the contract, the shipper was responsible only for $500 per
truck. But then the shipper off-loaded the second refueling
truck in exactly the same manner, and destroyed that truck
too." Under a doctrine of admiralty law called "deviation," the
$500 liability limit does not apply if a carrier intentionally
destroys the goods it contracts to carry, 7 so the issue in the
case was whether the destruction of the second truck should be
considered an intentional act.
Citing the Restatement, the court held that a person acts
intentionally if the "consequences [of his act] are substantially
certain" to occur. 8 After holding that the destruction of the first
truck cannot be considered intentional as a matter of law, the
court concluded:
52 Guglielmo & Malle, supra note 17, at 24-26.
53 See supra Part I.
The classic illustration used in Torts casebooks is Garret v. Dailey, 279
P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955), where the question was whether a child who pulled a
chair out from under an adult who was about to sit down had committed a battery even
though the child meant no harm.
155 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1167-68.
17 Id. at 1175.
58 Id. at 1176 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)).
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The same, however, cannot be said with respect to the second
refueler. The severe damage to the first refueler that resulted from
off-loading was visible upon removal of the cable strapping as the
refueler sat on the pier. Nevertheless, the stevedores proceeded to
off-load the second refueler in precisely the same manner as the
first. Because the uncontroverted evidence suggests the stevedores
were aware of the damage their chosen method of off-loading
inflicted on the first refueler, a rational trier of fact might very well
conclude that they knew the second refueler would suffer the same
fate with substantial certainty. 9
The court's ruling is consistent with Section 8A of the
Restatement (Second) and with the observations of Knobe and
others that our moral intuitions tend to consider an
undesirable side effect (i.e., the destruction of the truck) to be
as blameworthy as an intentional act when the actor knows in
advance that it will happen and acts anyway. Thus, at least in
this instance, tort law and everyday moral judgment seem to be
in harmony.
But the law is not uniform in its treatment of this issue.
First, as Kobick and Knobe point out in their contribution to
this Symposium, courts do not always impose liability for
known negative side effects.' They discuss a 2009 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in which the Shell Oil Company was
held not to have acted intentionally when pesticides carried as
cargo leaked from its tanker, as routinely happens when
chemicals are offloaded.6 The EPA spent some $8 million to
clean up the spill, and then sued Shell under CERCLA to
recover the cleanup costs. 2 The statute would hold Shell liable
if it had "arranged for [the] disposal . . . of hazardous
substances."63 This, according to Kobick and Knobe is a classic
case of a company desiring only to engage in profitable activity,
but acting with knowledge that it will cause environmental
harm as a side effect. Shell did not act with the purpose of
polluting the environment, it acted for the purpose of delivering
chemicals that it had sold. Nonetheless, it knew that the spill
would occur, and delivered the chemicals anyway.'
59 id.
60 Julia Kobik & Joshua Knobe, Interpreting Intent: How Research on Folk
Judgments of Intentionality Can Inform Statutory Analysis, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 409
(2009).
61 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1883-84
(2009).
62 Id. at 1876.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2006).
Kobik & Knobe, supra note 60.
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The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 in favor of Shell,65 a ruling
seemingly inconsistent with the moral intuitions uncovered in
one experiment after another. Why would there be such
consensus on a position that appears to be at odds with
everyday intuitions? Perhaps the word "arrange" suggests a
desire to accomplish the consequences. Had the statute merely
required reimbursement for an actor that "intentionally
disposed of hazardous substances," the result would have been
different. But this does not diminish Kobick and Knobe's point.
Rather, it suggests that it might have been Congress that acted
outside ordinary moral standards, and the Court merely
followed suit. Whichever branch of government is responsible
for the gap between moral judgment and the law, the gap
remains, as Kobick and Knobe demonstrate.
At the same time, some courts have imposed liability for
intentional acts when the actor knew that the side effect would
occur at some point in time, but did not actually know that it
would occur in this particular instance. This liability for
knowledge that harm will come to some victim, but without
knowledge that it will come to the particular individual who
suffered, goes beyond the intuitions reflected in studies that
Knobe has conducted, and, for that matter, is controversial
among courts and commentators.66
Consider one of Knobe's scenarios: a lieutenant orders a
sergeant to send his troops up Thompson Hill. The sergeant
responds: "But if I send my squad to the top of Thompson Hill,
we'll be moving the men directly into the enemy's line of fire.
Some of them will surely be killed!"7 Some of the men are killed
once the troops ascend the hill, and consistent with Knobe's
other studies, participants in this study say that the lieutenant
acted with intent in causing the soldiers' deaths." Knobe did
not investigate how subjects would react to the question of
whether the lieutenant intentionally caused the death of any
particular soldier who died on Thompson Hill. In his scenario,
the prediction that some troops will die matches the fact that
some troops did die. The lieutenant surely knew that each
individual soldier was at risk of dying, and that at least some of
the soldiers would actually die. But he did not know if some
65 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 129 S. Ct. 1870.
6 For discussion of the different positions taken by the various courts, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
6' Knobe, supra note 6, at 932 (internal quotation marks omitted).
' Id. at 933.
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individual soldier, call him Bill, would be one of the casualties.
Whether there would be consensus that the lieutenant
intentionally caused Bill's death remains an open question.
To illustrate, consider Parret v. Unicco Service
Company, a 2005 case decided by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma. 9 An employee (Parret) of a maintenance company
(Unicco) was electrocuted while replacing emergency lights at a
Bridgestone tire plant in Oklahoma City. Bridgestone was a
client of Unicco. Working on a lighting system that was not
electrically disabled was considered dangerous by both the
maintenance company and Bridgestone. Because Parret was
killed on the job and in the course of his employment, Parret's
wife was limited to the benefits afforded under Oklahoma's
workers' compensation system. However, the Oklahoma
worker's compensation statute has an exception for those who
are injured or killed by an intentional act. Unlike other
workers, they are entitled to sue in court for tort damages.
Parret's widow sued Unicco and Bridgestone, alleging that the
two companies should be held to have intentionally caused her
husband's death."0
The case went to the state supreme court, which ruled
that an act should count as intentional for purposes of workers'
compensation law when the employer knew with reasonable
certainty that the injury (or death in this case) would occur.
The opinion is written narrowly in this respect:
Thus, the employer must have acted, or have failed to act, with the
knowledge that injury was substantially certain, not merely likely,
to occur. The employer must have knowledge of more than
"foreseeable risk," more than "high probability," and more than
"substantial likelihood." Nothing short of the employer's knowledge
of the "substantial certainty" of injury will remove the injured
worker's claim from the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act, thus allowing the worker to proceed in district
court. 1
Regardless of how the court stated the rule, however,
the question in that case was not whether the employer and
client wanted him dead--of course they didn't. Rather, it was
whether their knowledge of the risk that someone would die
sooner or later if workers were ordered to do such dangerous
work amounted to knowledge, which in turn would imply
69 127 P.3d 572 (Okla. 2005).
70 Id. at 574.
71 Id. at 579.
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intent. This additional step in reasoning goes beyond the moral
intuitions that Knobe tested.
New Jersey has moved even further toward risk and
away from actual knowledge as the basis for attributing intent
to negative side effects. Laidlaw v. Hariton Machinery Co., a
2002 case,2 involved an employee who was severely injured on
the job when his gloved hand got caught in a machine into
which he was feeding material as part of a manufacturing
project. The employer had disabled the safety guard that could
have avoided the accident, although it periodically put the
guard in place when it knew that inspectors would be coming to
the plant. As of the date of the accident, no one had been
injured by the machine, although there had been at least one
close call, and the injured employee himself had expressed
concern about the machines being unsafe when operated by
new, inexperienced employees.73
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
employer should not have been granted summary judgment
because a reasonable juror could have found that the employer
knew with substantial certainty that a serious injury might
ensue from using the machine without the safety device. 4
The injurer's state of mind in these two cases is subtly
different. In the Oklahoma case, the employer assigned a task
to a series of people that sooner or later was bound to injure or
kill someone. In the New Jersey case, the same employee
performed the task repeatedly until he was hurt.
Professor Sebok,7" commenting on the criticism of these
extensions of intentional tort in an article by Professors
Henderson and Twerski,' refers to the scenarios as the
"iterated low risk act" and the "iterated low risk victim."77 Both
articles comment on the Discussion Draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, which adopts the "substantial certainty"
extension of intent." Henderson and Twerski are concerned not
72 790 A.2d 884 (N.J. 2002).
73 Id. at 887-88.
74 Id. at 897.
75 See Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the
Restatement (Third)'s Definitions of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (2001).
76 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness
in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating the Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133 (2001).
77 Sebok, supra note 75, at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78 The then-current draft discussed in these articles was RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (ALI Reporter Discussion Draft Fall
1999).
[Vol. 75:2
2009] BLAME, PRAISE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL RULES 541
with the basic notion that a person who knows that his act will
result in injury should be held to have caused that injury
intentionally, but rather with the failure of the Restatement's
definitions to preclude courts from expanding that principle to
include the iterated low risk victim and iterated low risk act
cases."9 Professor Sebok would solve the problem by eliminating
the principle altogether: an intentional tort is a tort committed
with intent. Basic negligence law should be good enough, he
argues, to take care of the other cases.' As an alternative,
Professor Simons suggests that the kinds of cases that generate
these problems, such as the maritime cases and workers'
compensation cases discussed above, should be treated
separately from basic tort law, again permitting the concept of
intentional torts to be reduced to a simple one in which the tort
is committed with the consequence intended as well.8
In both of these problematic scenarios, the line that has
blurred is the line between knowledge that harm will come to
the plaintiff here and now, and knowledge that harm will come
sooner or later (whether to this plaintiff or to someone else) if
the activity continues. In essence, these cases occur on the
border between intentional and reckless conduct, a notoriously
vague border to characterize." Thus, it should not be entirely
surprising that some judges regard as intentional torts harm
caused by egregiously reckless conduct. The comments to the
Discussion Draft of the Restatement (Third) recognize the
controversial nature of these extensions, and attempt to limit
their impact.'
'9 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 76, at 1136-37.
so See Sebok, supra note 75, at 1174-76.
81 See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1096 (2006).
82 See Sebok, supra note 75, at 1174-75; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The
Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111, 133-40 (2008).
83 "The applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the
conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small class
of potential victims within a localized area. The test loses its persuasiveness when the
identity of potential victims becomes vaguer, and when in a related way the time frame
involving the actor's conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting conduct and
harm becomes more complex." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 1 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
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III. CONCLUSION
Attributions of intent are indeed infused with moral
judgment, but indirectly so. It is not the case that we decide
asymmetrically whether someone acted intentionally
depending on the good or harm that was caused. Rather, we
attribute intent when an actor's state of mind equals or exceeds
the baseline norm for intentional activity. This baseline, in
turn, is not situated half way between acting for the good and
acting for nefarious purposes. Rather, it is skewed highly
toward morally defensible and useful conduct. The result is
that we are likely to ascribe intent to side effects that fall below
the baseline more readily because unwanted positive effects are
themselves below the baseline, a point also made by the
philosopher Thomas Nadelhoffer' The baseline itself tells us
that positive side effects should not be unwanted.
This account has serious ramifications for legal systems.
First, it suggests that legal systems are likely to expect the
good and disapprove of the bad, rather than expecting the bad
and rewarding the good. If people generally set their baselines
high, there is no reason for legal systems to do otherwise. This
prediction is borne out.
Secondly, the negative branch of the Knobe Effect-that
people do indeed attribute intent to unintended negative side
effects when the actor knew that they would occur-should also
find its reflex in the law if the law does a good job reflecting our
moral intuitions. This prediction is borne out as well, although
somewhat unevenly. As Kobick and Knobe point out, courts
and legislatures sometimes let actors off the hook for the
unintended but known negative consequences of their action.'
On the other hand, some courts have imposed liability on
actors for side effects that they did not know would occur, but
which they knew might occur if the activity continued. This is
an extension of the experimental results on moral judgment,
and remains controversial within the legal community.
Despite these issues, which are themselves ripe for
additional inquiry, the law of torts indeed treats as intentional
the known unintended negative consequences of an act.
Whether people actually construe the known negative side
effects of intentional acts as themselves intentional or whether
Nadelhoffer, supra note 21.
85 Kobick & Knobe, supra note 60.
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they recognize the difference between the two but attribute the
same degree of moral blame, the law appears to be in harmony
with these intuitions. At least in its black letter statement
then, the law tracks moral judgment quite well. This
relationship between legal doctrine and experimental results
suggests that the work being conducted in experimental
philosophy and cognitive psychology can indeed make a
contribution to mainstream legal discourse. Whether or not we
insist that the law track the moral judgments of the citizenry,
at the very least we should wish to know the extent to which it
does, and to assess the cost of any gaps between the two
against the benefits of whatever social or economic good legal
principles at odds with moral judgments might bring.

